A LETTER TO THE *Independent Whig*,

Occasioned by his

CONSIDERATIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF *GIBRALTAR* TO THE *BRITISH* Empire.

LONDON:

Printed for *A. Moore* in St. *Paul's* Church-Yard, 1720.

[Price Six-pence.]

a. 3939.

A

LETTER

TO THE

Independent Whig.

SIR,

YOUR Conſiderations of the Importance of *Gibraltar*, I hoped had had ſo good an Effect, as entirely to change the Minds of thoſe who were of Opinion *France* ſhou'd be freed from the Uneaſineſs they are under at our keeping it, (which is the true Meaning of the *French* engaging to get it reſtor'd to *Spain*) for 'tis the *French* whom it bridles moſt, both with reſpect to their Trade and Fleet; but I am afraid it is otherwiſe, by the Diſcourſe being lately renewed of that Important Place being to be yielded back to *Spain*, or as ſome of our Prints term it, to be left to be determined at the enſuing

Congreſs; * which looks as if we were undetermined whether to keep it or give it up. What you have ſaid is ſo ſtrong that I ſhould not have given you nor my ſelf this Trouble, but only to add ſome further Conſiderations, which I preſume might at that Time eſcape your Pen.

That *France* ſhou'd endeavour to diſpoſe us to ſuch a Ceſſion, I no ways wonder at; but that an *Engliſhman*, or that an *Engliſh* Miniſter, ſhould ſo much as hearken to it, is amazing! 'Tis the Buſineſs of *France* by all Ways imaginable to render us weak; and 'tis therefore our Buſineſs to be as ſtrong as poſſibly we can: No one can blame them, but all Mankind will blame us if we ſuffer our ſelves to be again out-witted by them. For tho' they are at preſent our good Friends and courteous Allies, yet how long they will continue ſo after the Peace is made with *Spain* is uncertain; and therefore every honeſt

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* *Poſt-Boy*, N° 4802, from *May* 3*d*, to *May* 5*th*, 1720. *Vienna*, *April* 28. *N. S.* The Expreſs which was diſpatch'd from *Paris* by the Baron *Van Bentenrider*, and arrived here this Day Se'night, brought a Confirmation that the Surrender of *Gibraltar* was not inſerted among the Preliminaries, but referred to the general Congreſs.

And lately, to the ſame Purpoſe, in ſeveral other of the printed weekly Papers.

and

and wiſe Miniſter ought to give ſuch Advice, and concert ſuch Meaſures, as may have a Tendency towards putting us into a poſture of repelling Force by Force, and prevent a Rupture by being in a Condition to baffle and return the Affront upon the Nation that ſhall offer it.

That this is the Drift of the Nation in another Caſe, is plain; I mean the reducing our Load of Debts into a Method of being ſoon diſcharg'd, that ſo we may be clear whenever we ſhall be forc'd to go to War again; and that it ought to be our Care in all other reſpects is as certain; for which Reaſon he muſt be acknowledg'd, to ſay no worſe, a very ſhallow Politician, who ſhould adviſe the giving up any Thing that may weaken us; and that the delivering up of *Gibraltar* will weaken us and ſtrengthen the *French*, our natural Enemy, is as demonſtrable as that three and two make five: Whether we conſider the Advantages we have reaped, or the Diſadvantages the *French* have ſuffer'd ſince our having, if I may ſo call it, that Half-way Houſe between *Breſt* and *Toulon*, by which it will always be eaſy to prevent the Junction of their *Mediterranean* and *Ocean* Squadrons. Nor can I believe but that the Misfortune which befell our *Turky* and *Streights* Fleets in the Year

1693,

1693, would have been prevented, if *Gibraltar* had then been in our Hands; for the Squadron under Sir *George Rooke*, that was Convoy to thoſe Fleets, were ſtrong enough to have beaten the *Toulon* Squadron out of the Seas, had it not been ſome little Time before joined by that from *Breſt*; which could not have been effected, had we then been Maſters of that Key of the *Mediterranean*; for neither of the two Squadrons wou'd have ventur'd to have paſſed the Mouth of the *Streights*, had not the *Spaniards* been Maſters there, from whom they had nothing to fear, but might boldly venture into that Bay in caſe of a contrary Wind, either from the *Ocean* or from the *Levant*, and there ſtay till a favourable Opportunity for their joining ſhould preſent. I make no doubt but Sir *George Rooke*, when he attacked *Gibraltar*, was moved to it by the Conſideration that ſuch a Misfortune as had formerly befallen him and the Trade of the Nation, would be for ever prevented, if we could be ſo ſucceſsful as to take that important Key of both Seas; and Experience has made it good, the *French* having never dared to ſhew themſelves at Sea after the Year in which that Conqueſt was made; which muſt not be attributed to the Loſs they ſuſtained of their Great Men of War at *Toulon*,

Toulon, by ſinking them in that Harbour, which was ſeveral Years after, but to our having *Gibraltar*; for it had been eaſy for them to have built the ſame or a greater Number of Ships in lieu thereof; but it would have been a very great Expence, which they were ſenſible had been vain and fruitleſs ſo long as we were Maſters of the Mouth of the *Streights*, and could by that Means prevent their being furniſh'd with the neceſſary Supplies of Anchors, Cables, and all other Tackle, Apparel and Furniture, which cannot be had ſufficiently in the *Streights*, but muſt be ſent them from *Breſt*, *Rochfort*, or other Parts in the Ocean. It is then very natural, and extreamly conſiſtent with the Wiſdom of that Court, to endeavour to diſpoſe us to part with what they have by fatal Experience found ſo diametrically contrary to their Intereſt: Before this it was that *France* lorded it in the *Mediterranean*; 'twas their Squadrons that curbed the Inſolence of the *Algerines*, that humbled the Pride of the Republick of *Genoa*, and that uſed to give the Laws in thoſe Seas, where at preſent, and I hope for all Time coming, they muſt be forced to receive it from the Crown of *Great-Britain*. Theſe are ſufficient Reaſons for *France* to deſire it ſhould return under the Domi-

Dominion of *Spain*, being well ſatisfied that *that* Crown could not make uſe of it ſo much to their Diſadvantage as the Crown of *England* can; they could never have brought together ſuch a mighty Fleet as that which was beaten at *La Hogue* in 1692, and with which they inſulted and attacked us in our very Channel, had not their Fleet been reinforced by the *Toulon* Squadron; which they would not have been able to have effected, had we then had *Gibraltar*; and it was afterwards for ſeveral Years of that War thought of ſuch conſequence to prevent the Uniting the *Mediterranean* Squadron with that of *Breſt*, that a very great Fleet at a prodigious Expence was judged neceſſary to be kept at *Cadiz* to intercept which-ever Squadron ſhould attempt to paſs the *Streights*, and thereby hinder their joining; the Charge of refitting and victualling which Navies would have been ſpent in *England*; had we had *Gibraltar*. And when in the laſt War Sir *George Rooke* had taken it, what a deſperate Uneaſineſs did the *French* expreſs at it! what Attempts did they not make to regain it! Their Grand Admiral the Count de *Toulouſe*, the late King's Son, was poſted from *Paris* to *Toulon*, to animate their Men by his Preſence, and venture a fair Engagement with the Fleet

Fleet under Sir *George Rooke*, that ſo if they could have been Victors, they might have beſieged it both by Sea and Land; had we not had *Gibraltar*, and that the Succeſs of that Sea Fight had been ſuch as we had been obliged to retire, we muſt have run through the Mouth of the *Streights*, whereby we might have loſt our whole Fleet before we could have been able to reach *Lisbon*. Nor did the *French*, as you obſerve, give over the Deſign of retaking it, tho' they were worſted by Sea; for after Sir *George Rooke* had quitted the *Streights*, they undertook the Siege of it by Land, aſſiſted with a ſmall Squadron under Monſieur *Ponty* by Sea; but neither the *Spaniſh* Army under the Marquiſs *de Villadarias*, nor that of the *French* under Marſhal *de Teſſe*, were able to retake it; nor could Monſieur *Ponty*'s Squadron have ſignified any thing, had we had never ſo ſmall a Number of Men of War there. Sure we cannot be ſo weak as to ſuppoſe the *French* did all this for the ſake of regaining a Fortreſs for the *Spaniards*, but purely to get it out of our hands, leſt it ſhould prove ſuch a Bridle to them, and ſuch a Protection to our Trade, as it has done, and as they feared it would. They were and ſtill are ſenſible it would, and does render us abſolute Maſters of the

Trade of the *Mediterranean*; they know no Ship can go in or out of the *Streights* but may be ſeen from its Hills, and follow'd by our light Frigats, and therefore it is that they are deſirous to have it from us: Nor ſhould I be ſurpriz'd if our Friends the *Dutch* too ſhould uſe their Endeavours to the ſame Purpoſe, by reaſon of the Annoyance it might otherwiſe give their Trade in caſe of any Rupture between us; which tho' I hope is very far off, yet 'tis our Buſineſs to be prepared againſt.

As to *Spain*, I look upon it they might want it long enough before the *French* would give themſelves any Diſturbance to have it change Maſters upon their Account, if they had no Intereſt of their own in view: But certainly the very Reaſons that induce *France* to take this Step, ſhould make us the more tenaciouſly reſolve not to part with it; and here I muſt own, it is ſaid *France* is not the only Nation that ought to be pleas'd at its being to be reſtored to *Spain*, but that we our ſelves ought to be glad to part with it, to prevent the great Charge we are at to maintain it. How ſtrange does this ſound out of the Mouth of an *Engliſhman!* Shall we, who have for ſo great a Number of Years raiſed Four, Five and Six Millions a Year, grow ſo unthriftily ſparing, as to grudge

grudge the Continuance of ſo ſmall a Sum as 50 or 60000 *l. per Annum*, for the Garriſoning of it, (which I will ſuppoſe to be the uſual Charge, as I gather from the Votes upon the Reports from the Committee of Supply) * altho' thereby we do ſo manifeſtly protect our own Trade and annoy our Enemies. If this were to have any weight with us, we ought to carry it yet further, and ſave all the Charge that

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* Votes of the preſent Seſſions, No. 11.

Reſolved, 'That a Sum not exceeding One Hundred Forty Eight Thouſand, Thirty five Pounds, 'Nine Shillings and Six-pence Halfpenny be granted to His Majeſty for maintaining his Majeſty's 'Forces and Garriſons in the Plantations, *Minorca*, 'Gibraltar, and for Proviſions for the Garriſons of 'Annapolis Royal and *Placentia*, for the Year 1720.

I do not pretend to know the exact Proportions of the Appointment to be made to each out of the above-mentioned; but I cannot be very much miſtaken if I compute it as here-under; nor is it of much conſequence if this Suppoſition ſhould not be exact, *viz.*

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
For the Iſland *Minorca*, including *Port-Mahon*,	70000	00	00
For *Gibraltar*,	50000	00	00
For the Forces and Garriſons in the Plantations, *Annapolis Royal*, and *Placentia*,	28035	09	06½
	148035	09	06½

is ſpent on thoſe Men of War which are fitted out only for Convoys to our Merchant Ships; for 'tis the ſame as to the Expence, whether it is ſpent upon that Place, or the Men of War for Convoys, ſince both are a Protection to our Trade; and I hope no honeſt Man would be for ſaving the Charge of Convoys where they are neceſſary. But as long as we keep this important Place, even a great deal of the Charge of Convoys may be ſaved by it, becauſe a very great Part of our *Mediterranean* Trade will be carryed on by Galleys that will venture to run without Convoy, knowing that when they are got into or going out of the *Streights*, in caſe a foul Wind meets them, they can put into *Gibraltar* Bay, and be ſecure till a favourable one preſents for them to purſue their Voyage. Should we therefore give up this Place of Safety for our Trading Ships, for the ſake of ſaving ſuch a paultry Sum as 50 or 60000 *l. per Annum*, we might juſtly be likened to thoſe that are *Penny wiſe and Pound fooliſh*; this is ſo far from being a good Reaſon to juſtify ſo impolitick a Step, that it is abſolutely the worſt Reaſon that can be given for it.

It would be much more to the Purpoſe to ſay, That *Spain* demands it of us as a Condition, *ſine quâ non*, without which they

they will not make a Peace with us; but with the good Leave of ſuch Reaſoners, I muſt obſerve, that the *Spaniſh* Ambaſſador at the *Hague* has not, that I remember, in any of his Memorials, till the very laſt, tho' they were generally fill'd with very extraordinary Demands, and ſuch as were not at all likely to be obtain'd, ever offer'd at demanding any thing further than the Reſtitution of what has been taken from his Maſter by all or any of the Allies in the Quadruple Alliance, during this preſent War; but *Gibraltar* was not taken during this preſent War, but in the laſt, and yielded to us for ever by the *Utretcht* Peace; and therefore does not come within any of thoſe Demands; and as it is advantageous to us, ſo alſo it is juſt for us to keep it. And I think it is hardly a Doubt, whether it can now be deliver'd back without a Conſent of Parliament, there being ſo very great a Difference between the Prerogative of making War and Peace, and the Right of giving up any Thing that belongs to the Imperial Crown of theſe Realms.

And, as the *Spaniſh* Ambaſſador has never given the leaſt Hint to make us think his Catholick Majeſty expected we ſhould be brought to part with it, till lately; ſo it may reaſonably be concluded the Court

of

of *Spain* never had any intent to ask it till put upon it by *France*: That Court are as ſenſible of the Meaning of the *French* in this Matter as we are; they know that when the Peace is made between *Spain* and us, we ſhall be the natural Friends of *Spain*, and they of us; and that they will have nothing to fear from our being poſſeſſed of *Gibraltar*, becauſe the mutual Advantages to both Nations by Trade, will oblige them, as well as us, not to break without an abſolute Neceſſity. They know that when that Place ſhall be no longer ours, they ſhall be ſubject to ſee their next Neighbours, the *French*, ride Maſters of thoſe Seas as before; and therefore it is their Intereſt we ſhould be at hand to prevent them, as it is very well known we ſhould have done, had they not violently of themſelves firſt broke the Neutrality of *Italy*: Wherefore our refuſing to deliver up *Gibraltar* will not be a Reaſon with the Court of *Spain* to refuſe to come into a Peace with us.

But what has *France* to do to ſay, They will engage to get it for *Spain*; are they then to have the Advantage, and the Honour of procuring it for them? I am jealous that they are endeavouring to obtain ſomething from *Spain* for doing it: Methinks, if it muſt be deliver'd up, we had

had better have the doing it our ſelves, than that *France* ſhould have it; for then we might hope to have ſome Places in the *Weſt-Indies* from *Spain* as an Equivalent for it; for though I eſteem it ſo inеſtimable a Jewel in the Crown of *England*, both with reſpect to our Safety, Trade, and Power, that hardly any thing the *Spaniards* or the *French* themſelves can give us will be a real Equivalent for it, yet I muſt confeſs it would have look'd with a much better Grace, if it muſt be yielded back to *Spain*, that they ſhould make us ſome Compenſation for it, either by yielding to us *Darien* in the *Weſt-Indies*, or the *Iſland of Cuba* or St. *Auguſtines*, and its Territories round it, in lieu thereof: And if it be to be done at the requeſt of *France*, methinks they have loſt an Opportunity which they had of valuing themſelves to the Court of *Spain*, by not telling what Equivalent they would give us for yielding it up; which at the ſame time that it had been a Compliment to the *Spaniards*, had been alſo but treating us civilly; for 'tis really affronting us to ſuppoſe us ſuch Idiots, or worſe, as that we ſhould part with it for nothing. Had they told the *Spaniards* they would give us the *Iſland of Martinico* in the *Weſt Indies*, and thoſe of *Cape Britain* in North *America*, or

or what they poſſeſs on *Hiſpaniola*, it might poſſibly have made amends for their pretending to diſpoſe of what was none of theirs, and might have ſcreen'd thoſe who ſhould have advis'd the parting with it, upon ſuch an Equivalent. But to ſay they would endeavour to procure it them from us, without mentioning what Equivalent we ought to have either from *Spain*, or from themſelves, is telling the World they can, in ſo palpable a Caſe, impoſe upon our Underſtandings, or our Honeſty; and is ſuppoſing us always the Duppes of *Europe*, and laviſh of our Blood and Treaſure to gain Conqueſts only to give them up again, tho' of never ſo much Importance to us, without obtaining any *Publick Advantages* to the Nation, whatever *private Ones* may be got for them.

I don't obſerve that *France* has offer'd to part with any Thing they were Maſters of before the breaking out of this War, whatever Deſire they would ſeem to expreſs for Peace: No! 'tis *England* that they hope to cajole into the doing that. Should we ſerve the *French* as they deſerve, and in return to this civil Uſage of theirs, offer the *Spaniards* to procure for them the Reſtoration of that Part which the *French* poſſeſs in the Iſland *Hiſ-*

paniola,

paniola, and which formerly belonged to *Spain*, how would ſuch an Offer be reliſh'd in *France*? With what Indignation and Scorn would they look upon us for it? And ought we not to treat them in the like Manner?

I muſt not however diſſemble that I hear we are to have an Equivalent for it, and that it is to be in Money, which we ſo much want. But ſure this of all Equivalents is the worſt! It would be an eternal Reproach to us to ſell it for any Sum of Money that could be obtained for it; and as much as I deſire to ſee the National Debt leſſened, I would not have any Part of it paid off by ſo diſhonourable an Action. Is *England* reduced ſo low as to be obliged to ſell the greateſt Advantage it has ever reaped abroad, for Money? Have we not heard enough of the Corruption of Miniſters when *Dunkirk* was ſold? Or has not the Nation thereby loſt Millions ſince, for every Hundred Thouſand Pounds, that was got for that Port? Though we had not any Thing like the Pretence of Right for keeping that Place, as we have for keeping *Gibraltar*; and ſhould 500000*l.* or a Million, or ten times thoſe Sums be offer'd for it, it will be impoſſible to perſuade us but that there muſt have been vaſt Sums diſtributed behind the Curtain,

or elſe that no Money would be taken for it. The Reaſons that occaſion'd the Sale of *Dunkirk*, were principally Two; the Deſign at that time of aggrandizing *France*, and the want of Money at the Court of *England*; but neither of thoſe can have weight now. We have ſo ſufficiently paid for the Greatneſs of *France* ſince, that I hope we ſhall be cautious how we ſell or part with any Thing that may be of Service to them, or of Diſſervice to our ſelves. And as to the Second, it is not poſſible to imagine any want there now, by Reaſon of the Largeneſs of the Civil Liſt, as well as that if there is any Money to be had for it, it muſt go in Exoneration of the Publick Debts. The adviſing and effecting the Sale of *Dunkirk*, was one of the Articles of Impeachment againſt the then Lord *Clarendon*, and I ſhould be heartily ſorry there ſhould be Occaſion to turn back to that Precedent to do the like now or hereafter on any the like Occaſion. But 'tis impoſſible to hear of ſuch Things without reflecting on paſt Occurrences; or without putting ſome Perſons in Mind that what has been, may be again: Tho' indeed we have ſeen in a late Inſtance, that Impeachments are ſo dilatory, and from the Nature of the Proceeding, ſo ſubject to to miſcarry, that it is probable

ble they will never be made uſe of for the future, but the much more effectual and more expeditious way of Bills of Attainder ſucceed in their room. And if the Nation at that time reſented the parting with that Place in that Manner ſo much, even before they had felt the Loſſes they have ſince ſuffered by it; how much more will it reſent the Loſs of *Gibraltar*! Which by its diſtance from us, cannot adminiſter thoſe Fears, that might reaſonably be apprehended from the Neighbourhood of ſuch a Garriſon, as would be neceſſary to be kept in *Dunkirk*, who might be wafted over almoſt in Cockboats, on a ſudden, to execute ſuch Deſigns as might be dangerous to our Conſtitution, and inconſiſtent with the Liberties and well-being of a Free People; but never ſo large a Garriſon kept at *Gibraltar*, can affect us in the like or any other Manner.

But if a Port be ſo neceſſary at the Mouth of the *Streights*, it may be asked how came we not to keep *Tangier* when we had it? To which it muſt be anſwer'd; 1ſt, That we had not the ſame Right to *Tangier* that we have to *Gibraltar*; to That we had no other than what the Crown of *Portugal* gave us, which was that of Conqueſt; to This we have the

Right of Conqueſt and of Ceſſion too; the Emperor of *Morocco*, in whoſe Territories *Tangier* is ſituated, was actually beſieging it, when we deſerted the Place, deſtroyed the Mole, and thereby ſpoiled the Harbour; which we cannot do by the Bay and Road of *Gibraltar*, tho' we ſhould deſtroy the Mole there, and be at never ſo much Expence to effect it. 2dly, The Nation was at that time very uneaſy from the Fears of the Succeſſion of a Papiſt to the Throne, and the Event ſhew'd they had but too much Reaſon; they knew that by the Influence of that Prince, that Garriſon was a Nurſery of Popiſh Officers and Soldiers; they had already given very large Sums of Money, Parliament after Parliament, for the Support and Maintenance of it; and were as conſtantly as they met asked for freſh Supplies for it; which as they had frequently done, ſo the Parliament aſſured the King they would continue to do; but they thought themſelves obliged *firſt* to be ſecure at home in that great Point of the Succeſſion: The Nation alſo perceived that it was made uſe of as a lame Leg to beg with, in order to get Money from the Parliament, which 'twas fear'd would be applied to ſuch Purpoſes as might be deſtructive both to our Liberties and Religion, or at

beſt

beſt ſquandred away on Court Favourites, and not imploy'd for the Maintenance of that Fortreſs; and by this Means it came to be deſerted. Yet could the Nation have been any ways ſecure that the Money they ſhould have given for its defence would have been rightly apply'd, no doubt that would never have been wanting; and the Loſſes we ſuſtained in our Trade for want of it, during King *William*'s War, (which was before we had *Gibraltar*) has ſufficiently ſhewn the Advantage it would have been of to have kept it; if it could have been done without endangering both our Civil and Religious Liberties: But ſince the giving Money to keep *Tangier*, would have expoſed us to ſo much Danger at home, it would have been a Fault not to have given up the Thoughts of preſerving it, in ſuch dangerous Circumſtances.

But theſe are ſuch Reaſons as can be of no Conſideration at preſent with relation to *Gibraltar*; the Emperor of *Morocco* might diſturb us in the Poſſeſſion of *Tangier*, becauſe he could ſtand in need of none of our Friendſhip to ſupport him againſt any neighbouring powerful Prince, as the King of *Spain* may and will do to aſſiſt him againſt *France* if they fall out, and muſt therefore continue to us the En-

joy-

ioyment of *Gibraltar* unmoleſted; or if he would go about to retake it again, we may venture to ſay, by paſt Experience, that it is not in the Power of *Spain* to effect it. Nor need we fear his Catholick Majeſty's breaking with us, from any Apprehenſion of loſing our Trade with his Country; for tho' it may be allowed to be a reciprocally advantageous Trade, yet it may very eaſily be ſhewn, that never ſince the Peace of *Utrecht*, *Communibus Annis*, that Trade has been of ſo much Advantage to us as it was formerly; no, nor ever will again, ſo long as the Faſhion of wearing their Cloaths after the *French* Manner continues; and unleſs the intollerable Duties of Cuſtoms, Conſumption and Paſſage, be altered and abated, and changed to the former Regulations. The Trade between *Spain* and *England* ſtands upon ſuch a Foot, as that it is as much for the Intereſt of *Spain*, as of *England*, or rather more, to continue in Peace on that Account; there is no Nation that can take of their Products and Growths, in Wines, Oyles, Fruits, *&c.* in any ſuch Quntities as we can; and that we are not Gainers upon the Ballance of that Trade, (a Thing which to thoſe who are not very well acquainted with that Matter, and think of it as it was formerly, may perhaps

haps ſeem a Paradox) I ſhall refer to the Calculators upon the Courſe of Exchange, for the Medium of the whole time between the Peace of *Utrecht*, and the breaking out of this laſt War; ſo that on that Head we may be abundantly eaſy. And therefore as there are no Reaſons to fear a Rupture with the Monarch in whoſe Territories it is ſituated, nor conſequently the Charge of a War attending the keeping of it; ſo neither can the other Reaſons that were valid in the Caſe of *Tangier*, be ſo in this: For his preſent Majeſty we are ſure cannot poſſibly have any other Intereſt herein, than what muſt be the Intereſt of his People; and therefore ſhould it be unhappily yielded by a Peace, contrary to the Sentiments of the Nation, we are ſure it cannot come from him, but from ill Advice, as the Cauſe thereof; for which Reaſon it will be from thoſe Ill-Adviſers that the Nation will expect Satisfaction: The Garriſon his Majeſty ſhall think fit to keep there will be ſuch as we can have no Suſpicion of; and we have no Reaſon to fear, but that effectual Care will be taken, that what Money ſhall be given for the Repair and Augmentation of the Fortification, ſupplying the Stores, and Payments of the Garriſon, ſhall be laid out for the Purpoſes it is given; from whence

whence it muſt be allow'd that there is no Reaſon to conclude, that becauſe the Nation refus'd to give Money on pretence of ſupporting *Tangier*, when they were ſatisfied the whole or the greateſt Part of it would not be apply'd to that Purpoſe, but to other deſtructive ones; that therefore they will not readily give the neceſſary Supplies for maintaining and preſerving *Gibraltar*, when they are ſatisfied of its being apply'd to the Intent they are given for.

I muſt freely acknowledge, that the *French* Declaration of War, when it was firſt publiſh'd, only rais'd my Indignation at them, for treating us ſo majeſterially, but did not much diſturb me from any Conſequences that I then feared would attend it; becauſe I look'd upon it, that notwithſtanding it is declared therein that Endeavours ſhould be uſed to obtain the delivering up of *Gibraltar*, yet that was to be underſtood to have been ſuggeſted to *Spain* as an Inducement to his Catholick Majeſty to have continued in Peace; and by not breaking the Neutrality of *Italy*, (and thereby the Peace of *Utrecht*) prevent the reſt of the Potentates concerned therein, from being forced to enter into War with him; and that as this was (or at leaſt was pretended to be) the Motive

which

which induced *France* to ſay they would engage to procure from us the Ceſſion and Delivery of that important and impregnable Fortreſs; ſo ſince that Offer had not had its deſir'd Effect, *viz.* the preventing his Catholick Majeſty from purſuing ſuch Meaſures as made it neceſſary to enter into a War with him, and that a War was then actually entred into both by *France* and us; I thought that as that Offer was not accepted by the *Spaniards*, and the intent of it, which was the Continuance in Peace, was render'd impracticable, there was an End of the intended Ceſſion; ſeeing that was offer'd only as a Means to preſerve the Peace; which tho' I am very far from believing it would have had the contrary effect if we had refuſed to comply with that Deſire, as I before intimated, yet I congratulated the Nation and my ſelf in my own Thoughts, that the very Propoſal of delivering it up would have been for ever buried in oblivion, and all ſuch Thoughts have been abſolutely laid aſide. But I find I was miſtaken; the Diſcourſe of its being to be given up at the enſuing Peace having lately been talk'd of much more than it was at firſt, notwithſtanding we have raiſed ſo much Money, and ſpent ſo much Blood, to reduce the *Spaniards* to accept of the Conditions ſtipulated for them in the

Quadruple Alliance; and that without the leaſt Thing to be deliver'd back to that Crown by *France* or any other of the Allies, that was taken from it, either in *Europe* or *America* in the former Wars; but this Piece of Diſtinction was reſerv'd for us, becauſe what we have is ſo abſolutely neceſſary for us, that in the Eyes of the *French* it is not fit we ſhould remain with it. Her late Majeſty's laſt Miniſtry was in this reſpect better Friends to the Safety and Trade of the Nation, than to give up any Thing that we our ſelves were poſſeſs'd of, or was of Advantage to us to keep; for though they were wickedly inſtrumental in giving up many Places then in the Hands of the Emperor and States-General, yet they gave up nothing that was in our Hands; but on the contrary, they obtain'd for us the entire Ceſſion of the greateſt Part of St. *Chriſtopher*'s in the *Weſt-Indies*, and of *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahone*, with the Iſland *Minorca* in the *Streights*, for ever. And if thoſe Advantages were obtain'd for us in that Miniſtry, how much greater Reaſon have we to expect additional ones under this? Eſpecially if we maturely conſider the Condition *Spain* is reduced to, as well as the poſture of Affairs in *France*; where, upon the leaſt Accident, every Thing muſt in all probability be in the utmoſt Confuſion,

and

and nothing but a continued Series of Succeſs, and the Expectation of an approaching Peace could keep them in the Quiet they at preſent ſeem to enjoy; which is a Circumſtance, that inſtead of obliging us to yield to every Thing they may demand of us, I ſhould think we could not deſire a fairer to induce us to believe they would rather yield to whatever we ſhould think fit in reaſon to propoſe to them; even tho' there ſhould be a more than ordinary Myſtery in the gathering all the Species of Money and *Bullion* into the Bank and *India* Company there. *Woe be to us*, if we find our ſelves in ſuch a Condition, as that only the fear of what uſe may be made of that Money ſhould frighten us into a Complyance with whatever Ceſſions, Agreements, or Conditions they ſhall think fit to inſiſt upon, either for themſelves or for others.

But we are told that *France* and *Spain* now inſiſt upon a ſpecifick Performance of the Offer or Promiſe we made them ſome time ago, of delivering up *Port Mahone* and *Gibraltar*, or one of them. If that *one* ſhould be *Gibraltar*, they may, whenever they pleaſe, recover the *other*, before we could ſuccour it from hence; for which Reaſon I look upon the delivering *that* to be delivering up *both*; and therefore if we part with one, even for

an Equivalent, it ſhou'd be *Port Mahone* rather than *Gibraltar*, this laſt being tenable and of very great Service to us without the other, but the former of little uſe and hardly tenable without the latter.

I cannot believe ſuch an Offer or Promiſe was ever made on our part *de Gayetè de Coeur*, willingly, without Neceſſity, or without any Conditions or Reſervations: For no Miniſtry ſurely would have ſo little Regard to their own Safety, as to lay themſelves open to the Cenſure of a *Britiſh* Parliament, by propoſing or agreeing to ſuch a thing, without ſome Condition or Equivalent, (not in Money) but for the Advantage of our Trade; or be no better Friends to the Honour and Trade of the Nation, than to come into ſuch a Matter without reaſonable Conceſſions on the part of *France* or *Spain*: If therefore ſuch a Promiſe has been made, it muſt undoubtedly have been either to prevent a War's breaking out, or to obtain ſome Advantages to us in *America*, that ſhould be thought an Equivalent for it.

If on the former Conſideration, that Promiſe is *now* of no force and void; for the King of *Spain* having render'd it impoſſible to continue in Peace with him, the entring into a War ought to be charged upon him, whereby the Promiſe made of delivering up *Gibraltar* and *Port Mahone*

Mahone cannot be inſiſted on : *For the Condition of the Obligation*, or Promiſe of delivering up one or both thoſe Places, *ought to have been, and no doubt was ſuch, as that if the King of* Spain does not continue in Peace, or, which is all one, *does not oblige us to begin the War with him, then the aforeſaid Promiſe is to be of full force and virtue, otherwiſe to be void* : But the King of *Spain* has neceſſitated us to begin the War with him, (unleſs we will take Shame to our ſelves, and acknowledge that we begun it raſhly and without Neceſſity) therefore there is no Reaſon on this Score for us to perform the Promiſe; ſeeing there can be no Pretence for the *Spaniards* inſiſting upon a ſpecifick Performance from us of a Promiſe, made to them upon a Condition which they did not comply with.

If on the latter, that of obtaining for us an Equivalent either from *France* or *Spain* or both, why do they not ſay what was offer'd or propos'd to be given us in exchange, that the Advice of the Parliament might be had upon it, before it be fully agreed to ? That ſo it may be acquies'd in, or ſuch Alterations inſiſted on as may be moſt neceſſary or advantageous to us : Which is the more reaſonable from the juſt Accuſations laid to the Charge of the late Queen's laſt Miniſtry for huddling

up

up the Conditions of an ignominious Peace, (which however gave up none of our own Conqueſts) without appriſing the Nation fully with what was intended. And that this is the Senſe of the Nation is manifeſt, from what paſs'd upon the Treaty of Partition in King *William*'s Time, whoſe Miniſtry was alſo cenſur'd for not counſelling him to take the Advice of his Parliament therein.

As to any inſiſting thereon by *France*, tho' the *giving* Peace to *Europe* on his own Terms, was the Language of the late *French* King, it is to be hoped that Language will not be allow'd now, when we have the Happineſs of ſo great a Prince upon the Throne of theſe Kingdoms, as likewiſe of a Minority in *France*, where, if the preſent *French* King ſhould happen to dye before his entring into his Majority, the Prince Regent might have need of the Aſſiſtance of all his Friends to preſerve that Kingdom in Peace, and ſeat himſelf quietly upon the Throne; for it cannot be forgot that the *Prince* of *Aſturias* has made no Renunciation of his Right to the Crown of *France*; nor can his Father's Renunciation bind him, who was born before that Renunciation was made; which, beſides what Monſieur de *Torcy* mentions in his Letters printed in the Report of the *Secret Committee*, that the *Renun-*

nunciation it ſelf might perhaps be eſteem'd in *France* to be of no force in the Opinion of the Nation, is a ſufficient Inducement for us to conclude, that it is more the Intereſt of the *French* to court us, than it is ours to court them.

And as to any Reſentment from *Spain*, it might very eaſily be made appear, as I have already hinted, that we have nothing to fear on Account of our Trade with them, ſo long as they ſhall follow the Court and *French* Faſhions, and keep up the ſame Duties of Cuſtom, Exciſe, Paſſage, *&c.* as they do now; and therefore if they would not come into a Peace without delivering up thoſe Places for nothing, we may be very eaſy on that Account; and ſhou'd the War continue with them, I ſhould think, when we have nothing to do for our Fleets in the *Baltick*, as I believe will ſoon be the Caſe by an univerſal Peace in the North, we might very eaſily and very ſoon make it too hot for *Spain*, by harraſſing their Coaſts with ſmall Fleets; bombarding all their Sea Ports both in the Bay of *Biſcay*, *Ocean*, and *Mediterranean*; preventing by a Squadron of ten or twelve Men of War at *Gibraltar*, their receiving any *Flotas* or *Galloons* from *New Spain*; by a like Number or leſs at *Port Mahone*, interrupt all their Trade from any Places in the *Mediterranean*; and by ſending ſome ſmall Squadrons

Squadrons to the *Weſt-Indies*, and relieving them from Time to Time, might burn, ſack, and deſtroy *Carthagena*, *Porto Bello*, *Vera Cruz*, the *Havana*, and all their Trade there; which would be of more Advantage if a Share of the Profit thereof were given to the *South Sea* Company, than either the Nation or that Company could gain by having their former *Aſſiento Contract* reſtor'd to them. Beſides, that *Spain* ought well to conſider who will take off their Growths or Products if we do not; for tho' *France* can furniſh them with *Stuffs* and *Linnens*, with *Lace*, and *fine Silks*, yet that Nation cannot take off their *Wines* and *Oyls* and *Fruits* in return, which we can, and always did; and therefore a ſevere and ſtrict Prohibition of thoſe Commodities and many others, in caſe of a War with them, would reduce their Clergy and Nobility, whoſe Eſtates chiefly depend thereon, to be ſoon ſick of ſuch a War.

If *Gibraltar* be deliver'd up otherwiſe than for a good Equivalent in the *Weſt Indies*, it muſt be underſtood as our begging Pardon, and giving Satisfaction for the Affront and Injury done to *Spain*, by beginning the War with them; in which Caſe whatever Colours we may put upon it, as our Love of Peace, our being ſurpriz'd into a Promiſe, or the like, it is impoſſible but the World will believe this Nation has

has been needleſly, and conſequently unjuſtly brought into a War; which tho' ſucceſsful, muſt be attoned for, not only by ſetting down with our own Loſſes and Expence of Blood and Treaſure, which otherwiſe ought to be ſome way ſatisfied by them; but alſo by making Reparation to *Spain* for the Loſſes we have caus'd them, by delivering up what was rightfully ours before the War begun. This will be the true Conſtruction of ſuch a Procedure, and whether this be honourable to the Nation, I leave any one to judge.

The Situation of this Place is of further Conſequence to us, in the Protection it may afford to our Trade againſt the *Sallee-Rovers*; a ſmall Squadron of Light Frigates, that may eaſily careen and refit there, will be always at hand with every Spurt of Wind to cruiſe upon thoſe barbarous inhumane People; who, methinks, by the mercileſs Slavery which they inflict on ſuch unhappy Creatures as fall into their Hands, have forfeited all Right to be treated as fair Enemies: And if a Reward were allow'd by the Government for every *Moor* that ſhould be taken by ſuch Cruiſers, and ſuch *Moors* thrown over board and drowned, it would be of great Service to the Nation, in as much as it would be the Occaſion *ſometimes* of taking them, or at leaſt of removing them out of the way of our Merchant Ships u-

ſing the *Streights*, and *Canary* Trades; and ſhould they uſe Repriſals, I think it would be much more eligible than to be made Slaves; nor could they long hold out with us on ſuch Treatment. I mention a Reward to be allowed for taking them, for we are ſo degenerated from our Predeceſſors, that the Offices in our Men of War are not reckoned Encouragement enough, but we muſt allow further Rewards in Money, if we expect our People ſhould either fight the Privateers that in time of War are fitted out by our Enemies, or the *Rovers* of *Barbary* and *Sallee*, or other Pyrates: Thoſe Heroick Officers and Seamen, who thought their Services ſufficiently rewarded, if they could by fighting, and deſtroying the Ships of War of their Country's Enemies, merit the Applauſe and Honour of having diſcharged their Duty in their ſeveral Poſts as they ought to do, being vaniſhed and gone; and a Race of wiſer Folks having ſucceeded in their room, who did not in the laſt War ſhew an Overfondneſs of venturing for dry Blows only; for which Reaſon an Act of Parliament paſſed in the late Queen's Time, to allow them, beſides their Pay, a further and very large Reward in Money for every Ship, Gun, and Man, that ſhould be taken from the Enemy. And if in this Matter of the *Sallee-Rovers* and Pyrates we

ſhould

ſhould alſo be ſo over-frugal, as to think much of having ſuch Reward paid out of the Treaſury, Cuſtoms, or Navy, a very ſmall Duty laid upon every Ton of Shipping, that ſhould go from *England* to the *Canaries*, *Weſt-Indies*, and into the *Mediterranean*, to be paid at the *Trinity-Houſe*, might be made a Fund for ſupporting the Charge thereof.

What I have ſaid with relation to *Gibraltar*, will in a great Meaſure hold good in reſpect to *Port Mahone*; the Ceſſion whereof was alſo yielded us by his Catholick Majeſty; for tho' this laſt be not in all Things of ſuch Conſideration to us as the former, yet it has its excellent Uſes, and ought not to be parted with without a juſt Equivalent; for it may be eſteemed an Acquiſition of very great Honour and Advantage to us; and notwithſtanding it does not from its Situation protect our Trade in ſuch a Degree as the former, which by the Capaciouſneſs of its Bay, and its nearneſs to the *Streights Mouth*, is more capable of being a Security to our Merchant Ships in their Traffick into and out of thoſe Seas, yet it is of very great Significancy to us, and I hope will not be parted with, any more than the other. We have found in the War of *Sicily*, of what Conſequence it has been to our Fleets, and may reap the ſame Benefit by it in any ſucceeding War with any other

ther Nations in thoſe Parts. I think indeed it is not ſo eaſily defended, becauſe the Iſland *Minorca*, of which it is a Part, lies open to a Deſcent, and will therefore require a much greater Garriſon, and a greater Expence to ſupport and defend it: But the Buſineſs of the difference of Charge is ſo very trifling a Reaſon not to do a thing, that is on other Accounts fit to be done, or when put in Competition with either the Figure this Nation ought to maintain, or the Honour of the Kingdom, or the Advantage and Protection of its Trade, that I ſhould be aſhamed once to to have mentioned it, had I not done it with a Deſign to expoſe the Unreaſonableneſs of it.

Upon the whole, I hope there is no Reaſon to fear that even this laſt Place ſhould be yielded back, ſince that very Perſon who had the Glory of taking it for us, and whoſe Titles of Honour are augmented by it, has ſo great a Share in the Management of our Affairs; and who, we may preſume, will uſe all his Intereſt both here and elſewhere to hinder its being deliver'd back, and thereby prevent the fading of thoſe Laurels which ſo deſervedly graced him at its Conqueſt.

I am, SIR,

Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

BRITANNUS.